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Abstract 
 Theories accounting for the development of analogical reasoning tend to emphasize 
either the centrality of relational knowledge accretion or changes in information processing 
capability. Simulations in LISA, (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003), a neurally-inspired 
computer model of analogical reasoning, allow us to explore how these factors may 
collaboratively contribute to the development of analogy in young children.   Simulations explain 
systematic variations in United States. and Hong Kong children's performance on analogies 
between familiar scenes (Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006; Richland, Chang, Morrison & 
Au, 2010).   Specifically, changes in inhibition levels in the model's working-memory system 
explain the developmental progression in U.S. children's ability to handle increases in relational 
complexity and distraction from object similarity during analogical reasoning.  In contrast, 
changes in how relations are represented in the model best capture cross-cultural differences in 
performance between children of the same ages (3-4 yrs) in the United States and Hong Kong.   
We use these results and simulations to argue that the development of analogical reasoning in 
children may best be conceptualized as a equilibrium between knowledge accretion and the 
maturation of information processing capability. 
!
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A Computational Account of Children's Analogical Reasoning:   
Balancing Inhibitory Control in Working Memory and Relational Representation 
!
Analogy provides a framework for comparing the structure of elements within a domain 
with the structure of elements of other elements in the same or another domain (Gentner, 1983; 
Gick & Holyoak, 1980). In other words, the elements of a source may be compared and 
subsequently mapped to a target.  An important consequence of this comparison process is the 
ability to make inferences about the elements of the target domain. Thus analogy is an important 
way that people can learn about new things based on prior knowledge (Holyoak & Thagard, 
1995; Hofstadter, 2001). Children’s development of analogical reasoning allows them to notice 
correspondences and make inferences about relationally similar phenomena across contexts.  
This skill greatly enhances their capacity for transfer of learning and schema abstraction, two 
essential aspects of children’s learning and cognitive development (Chen, Sanchez & Campbell, 
1997; Gentner, 1977; Goswami, 2001; Halford, 1993; Holyoak, Junn & Billman, 1984).  While 
many have argued that analogy is important for children’s cognitive development, there is 
considerable disagreement on the mechanisms underlying children’s development of mature, 
adult-like analogical reasoning.   
Computational models of analogy have contributed immensely to understanding the 
constraints shaping analogical reasoning in adults (e.g., Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1989; 
Holyoak & Thagard, 1989a, 1989b; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003;  Keane, & Brayshaw, 
1988; Keane, Ledgeway, & Duff, 1994; Morrison et al., 2004; Viskontas et al., 2004); however, 
they have played a relatively minor role in helping to elucidate the factors important for the 
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development of analogical reasoning in children (see Doumas, Hummel, & Sandhofer, 2008; 
Halford et al., 1994; Gentner et al., 1995 and Leech, Mareschal, & Cooper, 2008 for notable 
exceptions).  Our intent in this paper is to demonstrate the efficacy of using a neurally-inspired 
symbolic-connectionist computational model of analogy (i.e., LISA; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 
2003), to examine how various factors important for analogical processing relatively impact the 
development of analogical reasoning in children. 
Developmental Change in Analogy 
Hypotheses for explaining age-related behavioral differences have typically focused on 
the importance of relational knowledge acquisition or on the maturation of executive resources 
including working memory and/or inhibitory control.  
Relational Knowledge 
Relational Primacy.  Goswami (1992, 2001; Goswami & Brown, 1989) has argued that 
children are attuned to and able to map relations in a rudimentary manner from early infancy, but 
their later analogical reasoning skills build on prerequisite content knowledge.  Citing Piaget's 
tasks using fairly sophisticated relations such as "steering mechanism," as an example, Goswami 
argues that children must have the necessary relational knowledge in order to reason 
analogically, however, given that knowledge they should be successful in reasoning analogically.  
Knowledge is thus viewed somewhat quantitatively, such that with greater knowledge acquisition 
one accrues increasing numbers of pre-requisites to reason analogically across more and varied 
contexts. 
 Relational Shift.  In an alternative theoretical framework, Gentner and Rattermann 
(1991; Gentner, 1988; Rattermann & Gentner, 1998) have posited a causal role for knowledge 
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acquisition in shifting children's reasoning from focusing on object properties to focusing on 
relations. They hypothesized a domain-specific “relational shift” during cognitive development 
such that as children build knowledge in a domain, they move from attending to similarity based 
on object features (i.e., perceptual properties of the entities being compared), to relational 
similarity (i.e., correspondences between the relations in each entity being compared). This 
hypothesis is supported by patterns identified in children’s processing of metaphors (Billow, 
1974; Gentner, 1988) and causal analogies (Rattermann & Gentner, 1998), as well as children’s 
ease of making analogies in very familiar domains (e.g., the human body; Hatano & Inagaki, 
1987). 
 Proponents of the relational shift hypothesis postulate that change in a child’s analogical 
reasoning is not age-related per se, but rather is directly tied to knowledge acquisition.  The 
relational shift is domain specific, based upon knowledge acquisition, and can be observed in 
adults when learning new content as well as children (Gentner & Ratterman, 1991). This 
argument aligns with classic findings demonstrating that adult experts in a domain tend to attend 
to relations, while novices attend to object features (Chi, Feltovich, Glaser, 1981).  
 Kotovsky et al. (1995) used the structure mapping engine (SME) to model the results of 
Gentner & Ratterman (1991), Kotovsky et al. (1995) modeled the relational shift by using more 
"object-centered" representations, containing only lower-level relational representations, to 
model younger children, and using more "relation-centered" representations, using a higher-order 
relation to link two lower-level relations, to model older children and adults. Because of the 
systematicity constraint, SME showed a mapping advantage for the representation containing the 
higher-order relation. It is interesting to note, however, that while this solution does result in 
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improved performance in SME, it also results in an increase in processing demands for the 
system.  This is not a problem for SME because the model is not subject to processing 
constraints, but may suggest that the solution is not plausible for humans with limited working-
memory capacity.  It is also important to note that technically both representations are relation-
centered (not object centered) in that they both make explicit use of relations. While this 
rerepresentation of knowledge can account for the change in reasoning noted by Gentner and 
Ratterman in SME, it does not explain why children sometimes do not reason relationally in spite 
of being fully aware of the relations in use (Goswami, 1991) and demonstrating knowledge of 
higher-order relations (Richland, Morrison & Holyoak, 2006). 
More recent work suggests that the relational shift may have more to do with pragmatics 
rather than just a shift. Specifically, reasoners may develop skills to determine whether object or 
relational similarity provides the information necessary to solve a particular problem (Bulloch & 
Opfer, 2009).  In a task with 3,4,5 year olds and adults, older children and adults were more 
sensitive to the predictive accuracy of each type of similarity.  On problems where relational 
similarity was predictive, these participants made more relational judgments over time, while on 
problems in which object similarity was more predictive, participants made increasing object 
similarity judgments.  
In an alternative to Kotovsky et al.’s (1995) approach, Leech, Mareschal, and Cooper 
(2008) have proposed a theory of relational priming as a mechanism for the development of 
children's ability to make analogies.  Citing the lack of an explicit theory of how structured 
representations are learned this approach posits that analogy does not use explicit representations 
of relations.  Instead, relations are state transformations, and analogy is simply priming of one 
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state given another as a cue.  The challenge with this model of knowledge acquisition is to 
explain the difficulty of documenting implicit relational priming in adults (Spellman Holyoak & 
Morrison, 2001), and children's and adult’s ability to reason about relations in explicit, flexible 
ways that are unsupported by implicit representations (e.g. Brown & Kane, 1988; Kotovsky & 
Gentner, 1996; Namy & Gentner, 2002; Smith, 1984; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995). In addition, 
Doumas, Hummel, & Sandhofer (2008) have recently proposed a theory and implemented a 
computational model (DORA) of how explicit structured representations can be learned from 
unstructured examples, thereby eliminating one of the major criticisms of using structured 
representations to simulate analogical reasoning. 
Knowledge Rerepresentation.  An information processing view provides a third 
perspective on the role of knowledge acquisition in children's development of analogical 
reasoning.  Based on this perspective, we posit that while a prerequisite knowledge base is 
essential, qualitative changes in relational knowledge representations can reduce processing 
demands.  Doing so would thereby free resources to enable more sophisticated analogical 
reasoning within the constraints of limited working-memory capacity at any given point during 
maturation.  This is of particular importance for young children, since resources known to be 
required for analogical reasoning such as working-memory capacity and inhibitory control 
(Baddeley et al., 1998; Krawczyk et al., 2008; Kubose, Holyoak, & Hummel, 2002; Morrison, 
Holyoak, & Truong, 2001; Morrison et al, 2004; Morrison, 2005; Viskontas et al, 2004; Waltz et 
al., 1998; Waltz et al 2000, gradually increase during childhood (e.g., Bjorklund & Harnishbeger, 
1990; Diamond, 2002; Diamond Kirkham and Amso, 2002).    
Executive Resources 
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Knowledge acquisition alone does not appear to explain all identified patterns of 
analogical reasoning (Goswami, 1991).  Even when knowledge is held fairly constant across 
conditions, children exhibit differential success on analogical reasoning problems depending on 
the executive resources demanded of the problems themselves (Richland, Morrison & Holyoak, 
2006).  
Relational Complexity.  Halford (1993) has argued for a primary role of maturation of 
children’s working-memory capacity in development of children’s analogical reasoning.  In 
particular, he has argued that working-memory capacity is crucial to the ability to process 
complex relations, an important characteristic of mature, adult analogical reasoning.  Halford and 
colleagues (Andrews & Halford, 2002; Halford et al., 2002) have demonstrated that young 
children have difficulty in complex relational tasks in which they must process multiple relations 
simultaneously.  Specifically, they proposed a theory of relational complexity to categorize 
relations by the number of sources of variation that are related and must be processed in parallel.  
For example, the simplest level of relational complexity, a binary relation, is defined as a 
relationship between two arguments, both of which are sources of variation.  Thus “boy chases 
girl” specifies a single relation (chase) between two arguments (boy and girl). A reasoner would 
have to hold both arguments and the relevant relation in mind to reason on the basis of this 
relationship.  The next level of relational complexity, a ternary relation, includes three arguments 
as sources of variation.  Integrating two binary relations with three arguments such as "mom 
chases a boy who chases a girl" is also considered a ternary relation. Halford (1993) suggested 
that on average, children's working-memory capacity is such that after age two, children can 
process binary relations (a relationship between two objects), and after age five they could 
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process ternary relations.  Thus, children of age two could perform very simple analogy 
problems, but not problems that require integrating multiple relations.   
Inhibitory Control. Zelazo, Frye and colleagues (1998; Zelazo, Müller, Frye, & 
Marcovitch, 2003) have identified similar age related progressions using an alternative 
formulation of relational complexity that focuses more directly on the importance of inhibition in 
executive control.  According to their Cognitive Complexity and Control (CCC) theory, the 
number of conflicting hierarchical rules that must be maintained in order to accomplish a task 
defines complexity. For example, in the Dimensional Change Card Sort task, children were given 
one set of sorting rules (color or shape) and then asked to sort by a new rule.  Children ages 3-4 
were successful on each sorting task when performing them separately, but failed when required 
to integrate these two to determine which rule to use.  They explain this failure as a maturational 
limitation in reflective consciousness and executive function. 
While the relational complexity theory has been proposed in opposition to knowledge 
acquisition theories of analogical reasoning development, other findings suggest that executive 
resources and at least the relational shift may be closely related. Markman & Gentner (1993) 
developed an analogy mapping task for use with adults, which allowed participants to reason 
based on either relational or object similarity.  Using this task Waltz et al. (2000) found that 
increases in working-memory load shifted adult participants from using relational similarity to 
using object similarity to complete the task.  It is not clear, however, how working-memory load 
affects this balance. One possible explanation is that working-memory load utilizes the inhibitory 
resources in working memory necessary to suppress responses based on the salient features of 
objects during relational processing and object matching, an argument previously made by 
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Morrison and colleagues (2004) to help explain analogical reasoning performance in frontal 
patients (see also Krawczyk et al., 2008) and older adults (Viskontas et al., 2004). 
Likewise, Richland, Morrison, and Holyoak (2006) proposed that inhibitory control 
might help to explain the relationship between maturation and the impact of object similarity in 
young children.  While inhibitory control has been a major topic in models of cognitive 
development (e.g., Bjorklund & Harnishbeger, 1990; Diamond, 2002) it has not previously been 
applied to understanding the development of analogy; however, the hypothesis that inhibitory 
control is important for the development of analogy is consistent with results from other 
cognitive tasks (e.g., Diamond, Kirkham & Amso, 2002; Lorsbach & Reimer, 1997; Zelazo et 
al., 2003).  In one example, Diamond, Kirkham and Amso (2002) manipulated the day-night 
task, a Stroop-type task in which children are instructed to say “day” when shown a picture of a 
moon and “night” when shown a picture of sun.  Inhibitory control is tested because presumably 
children’s semantic category of “day” becomes activated when they are shown a scene depicting 
a sun, but they are instructed instead to generate a word with the opposing semantic meaning, 
“night.” Children under the age of four and a half consistently failed on the task. When Diamond 
and colleagues reduced the inhibitory requirements of the task by asking participants to say 
“dog” and “pig” instead of “day” and “night,” young children performed much better, suggesting 
that limits in their inhibitory control explained low success rates in the day-night version of the 
task.   
Changes in inhibitory control have already been useful in explaining analogy 
performance in several other groups associated with compromised executive functions.  For 
example Morrison and colleagues (2004) found that patients with damage to the prefrontal cortex 
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showed a preference for using featural over relational similarity in an analogy mapping task, 
much like college students under dual-task conditions (Waltz et al., 2000). In a follow-up study, 
they systematically manipulated the need for suppression in a verbal analogy task and found this 
was the best predictor of the change in performance in analogy problems of low relational 
complexity.  Similar results with frontal patients were also found in a forced-choice visual 
analogy task which required patients to choose between a relational match and either a semantic, 
perceptual or unrelated distractor, with patients frequently choosing semantic distractors over 
relational matches (Krawczyk et al., 2008). Likewise, Viskontas and colleagues (2004) showed 
that changes in inhibitory control in working memory could account for older adult’s deficiencies 
in processing visual analogies that required relational integration and inhibition. We believe 
similar changes may also help to explain changes in featural and relational responding as 
documented by Rattermann and Gentner (1998; Gentner & Rattermann, 1991).   
In our present effort we focus on understanding how changes in inhibitory control in 
working memory may be able to explain changes in children's analogy performance 
characterized by both relational complexity and featural distraction and how representation of 
relational knowledge can help to reduce the demand for this resource and thus help to explain a 
cultural difference in analogy performance. 
A Computational Account of Analogy 
In an effort to understand the factors behind changes in children’s analogical reasoning in 
scene analogy problems, we modeled results from Richland, Morrison, and Holyoak (2006) and 
Richland, Chan, Morrison  and Au (2010) in LISA (Learning and Inference with Schemas and 
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Analogies; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003,).  The four counterbalanced versions of an example 
problem from these two experimental papers are provided in Figure 1. 
 __________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
__________________________ 
Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies (LISA) Architecture 
LISA is a neurally-inspired computational model of relational reasoning.  LISA uses 
temporal synchrony to dynamically bind distributed (i.e., connectionist) representations of 
relational roles to distributed representations of their fillers in working memory.  Importantly, 
because LISA dynamically binds representations of relational roles to their arguments (i.e., 
because it solves the binding problem; see e.g., Hummel et al, 2004) LISA’s representations 
support structured (i.e., explicitly relational) processing. While the explicit structured 
representations utilized by LISA can be “hand-coded” by the researcher, they can also be 
generated from unstructured examples by using an extension of LISA called DORA (Doumas et 
al., 2008).  
When LISA "thinks about" a proposition, it fires roles in synchrony with their fillers, and 
fires separate role-filler bindings out of synchrony with one another. The synchronized (and de-
synchronized) patterns of activation serve as the basis for memory retrieval, analogical mapping 
and inference, and schema induction (see Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003) and has previously 
been used to account for changes in reasoning with age (Viskontas et al, 2004) and with damage 
to either the prefrontal or anterior temporal cortex (Morrison et al., 2004). 
Development of Analogical Reasoning  !13
__________________________ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
__________________________ 
LISA represents relational structure using a hierarchy of distributed and localist codes 
(see Figure 2 for a schematic representation of LISA’s architecture as applied to the proposition 
chase (cat, mouse)). At the bottom of the hierarchy, semantic units (small circles in Figure 2) 
represent objects and relational roles (i.e., predicates) in a distributed fashion.  For instance, each 
role of the chase relation would be represented by semantic units such as aggressor for the first 
chase role (chaser or c1 in Figure 2), victim for the second role (chased or c2 in Figure 2), and 
pursuit for both.  Similarly, the arguments “cat” and “mouse” would be represented by units 
specifying their meaning (e.g., cat: cat, pet; mouse: mouse, pest; both: animal). The exact content 
of the semantic units is not important to LISA’s operation, they might be whatever is meaningful 
to describe the predicates and objects and more importantly whatever is neurally plausible to do 
so. At the next level of LISA’s hierarchy, localist predicate and object units  (triangles and large 
circles, respectively, in Figure 2) represent relational roles and their arguments and have bi-
directional excitatory connections to the corresponding distributed semantic units.  Sub-
proposition (SP) units (rectangles in Figure 2) bind roles to their arguments, and have 
bidirectional connections to the corresponding predicate and object units.  In the case of chase 
(cat, mouse), one SP would bind “cat” to the first role of chase (i.e., chaser, c1), and another 
would bind “mouse” to the second role (i.e., chased, c2).  At the top of the hierarchy, proposition 
units link role-filler bindings (i.e., SPs) into complete propositions via excitatory connections to 
the corresponding SPs.  In addition to the excitatory connections already mentioned, localist 
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units also have bidirectional inhibitory connections between units of the same type.  For instance, 
cat and mouse would have an inhibitory connection, as would the two SP units representing the 
chaser/cat and chased/mouse role bindings. 
__________________________ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
__________________________ 
A complete analog (i.e., situation, story or event) is represented by the collection of 
semantic, predicate, object, SP and proposition units that collectively code the propositions in 
that analog.  For instance, Figure 3 shows a representation for a 1-Relation with Distractor  scene 
analogy problem shown in Figure 1b.  This representation includes both an analog in the driver 
and two competitive recipient analogs. Analogs in the driver and recipient do not share object, 
predicate, SP or proposition units; however, all analogs in LISA’s long-term memory are 
connected to the same set of semantic units.  Thus, the distributed semantic units permit the 
localist (i.e., proposition, SP, predicate, and object) units in one analog to communicate with the 
units in other analogs.  
For the purposes of memory retrieval and analogical mapping (Hummel & Holyoak, 
1997) as well as analogical inference and schema induction (Hummel & Holyoak, 2003), analogs 
are divided into two mutually exclusive sets: a driver and one or more recipients. The driver 
controls the sequence of events: propositions in the driver become active (i.e., enter working 
memory) one at a time. When a proposition enters working memory, the binding of its roles to 
their arguments is represented by synchrony of firing: All the units under a given SP fire in 
synchrony with one another, and separate SPs fire out of synchrony with one another.   The result 
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on the semantic units is a set of mutually desynchronized patterns of activation (see Figure 4bi): 
one pattern for each active SP (i.e., role binding) in the driver.  In the case of chase (cat, mouse), 
the semantic units of “cat” (e.g., cat, pet, animal) would fire in synchrony with the features of the 
first role of chase (i.e., chaser, c1), while the semantic units representing “mouse” (e.g., mouse, 
pest, animal) fires in synchrony with the second role (i.e., chased, c2).  This oscillatory pattern of 
systematic SP activation and deactivation results from the inhibitory connections between SPs 
and is intrinsic to LISA’s operation.  
__________________________ 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
__________________________ 
In order to represent the proposition chase (mouse, cat), LISA activates exactly the same 
semantic units, but their synchrony relations are reversed (“mouse” fires in synchrony with the 
chaser (i.e., c1), and “cat” fires with chased (i.e., c2)).  The resulting patterns of activation on the 
semantic units drive the activation of the localist units representing the relational structure in the 
various recipient analogs, and serve as the basis for analogical mapping, inference, schema 
induction, and the other functions LISA performs (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997, 2003). Each set of 
SPs from a given analog are referred to as a working-memory phase set.  For LISA to completely 
“think about” an analog all of the SPs making up the propositions for that analog must time-share 
in the working-memory phase set. 
__________________________ 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
__________________________ 
Development of Analogical Reasoning  !16
The final component of the LISA architecture is a set of mapping connections between 
units of the same type (e.g., object to object, predicate to predicate etc.) in the driver and the 
various recipient analogs (see Figure 5).  These connections grow (via Hebbian Learning) 
whenever corresponding units in the driver and recipient fire at the same time.  They permit 
LISA to learn the correspondences (i.e., mappings) between analogous units in separate analogs.  
They also permit correspondences learned early in mapping to influence the correspondences 
learned later.  
Inhibition in Working Memory in LISA.  
In addition to providing an account of human relational reasoning, LISA can also serve as 
a model of working memory.  When a proposition is fired, one of its role bindings (SPs) enters 
the focus of attention in working memory.  Likewise, all of the units connected either directly or 
indirectly in long-term memory receive activation.  The various SPs timeshare the limited-
capacity focus of attention; however, recently activated units remain in active memory--their 
activation decaying over time if they are not brought back into the focus of attention.  This 
conception of working memory is similar to that developed by Cowan (1995), Fuster (2008) and 
Kane and Engle (2002), where working memory involves neurons in prefrontal cortex activating 
neurons in posterior cortex representing information in long-term memory. As detailed below, the 
systematic activation and dynamic binding of information stored in long-term memory in LISA’s 
working memory is critically dependent on inhibition, a cognitive function frequently associated 
with the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Morrison et al., 2004; Perret, 1974; Shimamura, 2000) and 
frequently cited as important in human development (e.g., Bjorklund & Harnishferger, 1990; 
Diamond, 2002, Hasher & Zacks, 1988, Viskontas et al., 2004).  
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Of particular importance to the present simulations, inhibition plays a role in the selection 
of items to enter working memory because selection is a competitive process:  Propositions in 
the driver compete to be entered into working memory on the basis of several factors, including 
their pragmatic centrality, or importance, support from other propositions that have recently 
fired, and the recency with which they themselves have fired.  Reduced driver inhibition results 
in reduced competition and more random selection of SPs to fire.  The selection of which SPs are 
chosen to fire, and in what order, can have substantial effects on LISA’s ability to find a 
structurally consistent mapping between analogs. It follows that reduced driver inhibition, 
resulting in more random selection of propositions into working memory, can likewise affect 
LISA’s ability to discover a structurally-consistent mapping.   
The role of inhibition in the activity of a recipient analog is directly analogous to its role 
in the activity in the driver. Recipient inhibition causes units in the recipient to compete to 
respond to the semantic patterns generated by activity in the driver.  If LISA’s capacity to inhibit 
units in the recipient is compromised, then the result is a loss of competition, with many units in 
the recipient responding to any given pattern generated by the driver. The resulting chaos 
hampers (in the limit, completely destroys) LISA’s ability to discover which units in the recipient 
map to which in the driver.  In short, inhibition determines LISA’s working memory capacity 
(see Hummel & Holyoak, 2003, Appendix A; Hummel & Holyoak, 2005), controls its ability to 
select items for placement into working memory and also regulates its ability to control the 
spreading of activation in the various recipient analogs. As such, inhibition in LISA is critical for 
the model's ability to favor relational similarity over featural similarity.  This conception is also 
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highly complementary to that presented by Zelazo and colleagues (1998, 2003) who describe the 
need to inhibit one rule (relational structure), in the serve of another. 
LISA Simulations 
To test whether LISA's architecture could explain the major trends identified in children's 
developmental pathways of analogical reasoning, we used LISA to simulate children's 
performance on scene analogy problems (Richland et al., 2006). These problems had been 
created to examine the relative effects of distraction from object-based features (relational shift) 
and relational complexity when pre-requisite knowledge was likely and was effectively held 
constant across conditions.  These problems were tested with English and Chinese (Cantonese) 
speaking children to reflect the variety of developmental trends across cultures. 
Scene Analogy Problems 
Richland, Morrison and Holyoak (2006) developed a set of scene analogy problems to 
investigate relational complexity and featural distraction within a single analogical reasoning 
task based on a paradigm originated by Markman and Gentner (1993). The relations and the 
objects used to represent them were familiar to preschool age children (see Richland, Morrison 
& Holyoak, 2006, Experiment 2).  
Figure 1 depicts an example of each of the four counterbalanced versions that were 
created for each of the 20 picture sets. Each set of problems factorially varied (1) the number of 
instances of the relevant relation that needed to be mapped  (1-Relation or 2-Relation), and (2) 
the presence of an object in the target scene that was either featurally similar (Distractor) or 
dissimilar (No-Distractor) to the object to be mapped in the source scene. 2-Relation problems 
were created by having one object that was not involved in the principal relation (dog in Figure 
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1a and 1b) in the 1-Relation problems participate in the principle relation for the 2-Relation 
version (chase (dog, cat). Distractor and No-Distractor versions were created by having an extra 
object in the same picture that was either similar (sitting cat in Figure 1b and 1d) or dissimilar 
(sandbox in Figure 1a and 1c) to the item to be mapped in the source picture (running cat). 
Children were asked to indicate which object in the target picture corresponded to the indicated 
object in the source picture (the running boy in the example in Figure 1). 
 United States Children.  In a series of experiments with children from the United States 
(U.S.), Richland, Morrison and Holyoak (2006) found reliable effects of both relational 
complexity and featural distraction on children’s analogical reasoning ability (see Figure 6). 
Specifically, 3-4 year olds showed strong effects of both distraction and relational complexity 
that interacted to reveal the highest accuracy in the 1-Relation/No-Distractor condition and the 
lowest accuracy in the 2-Relation/Distractor condition.  This pattern was similar for the 6-7 year 
olds, with main effects of both relational complexity and distraction.  In contrast, the 13-14 year 
olds showed a main effect of relational complexity but no effect of distraction. In a second 
experiment Richland, Morrison & Holyoak (2006), demonstrated these effects in young children 
were not due to problems in identifying the relevant relations.   
________________________ 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
________________________ 
Error data confirmed that these patterns in accuracy showed corresponding 
developmental effects of both relational complexity and object similarity distraction.  Increasing 
the level of relational complexity raised the number of relational errors in the youngest children 
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the most, with decreasing numbers with age.  Adding a featural distractor led to greater object 
similarity errors in the youngest children in contrast to the oldest children who showed no effect.  
Interestingly when children solved problems with both a featural distractor and two levels of 
relational complexity, featural errors, as opposed to relational complexity errors, were the most 
common.   
 Children from Hong Kong.  As a follow-up to our study with U.S. children we 
investigated whether 3-4 year old native Cantonese speakers from Hong Kong (H.K.), showed 
the same pattern as US children (Richland, Chan, Morrison & Au, 2010).   There are several 
reasons to believe that the Chinese children would score differently on analogical reasoning 
problems than U.S. children based on their knowledge base and experience with reasoning about 
relations.  Adult studies have shown cultural differences in normative patterns for drawing 
relational inferences (see D'Andrade, 1985; Hansen, 1983; Ji, Peng & Nisbett, 2000; Nisbett 
2003) such that Chinese and Japanese reasoners may be more attuned to relational 
correspondences than U.S. participants.  These differences also appear in cross-cultural 
variations in children's socialization and linguistic routines, with Asian caregivers using more 
action oriented language and referential verbs in play and caregiving than relatively object-
focused U.S. caregivers (e.g., Korean: Au, Dapretto, & Song, 1994; Gopnik, Choi & 
Baumberger, 1996; Japanese: Fernald & Morikawa, 1993; Ogura, Dale, Yamashita, Murase, 
2006; Chinese: (Mandarin) Tardif, 1996; Tardif, Gelman & Xi, 1999; Tardif, Shatz, Naigles, 
1997; (Cantonese) Leung, 1998). Chinese children themselves may additionally show a higher 
relative rate of verb usage in mandarin (Tardif, 1996; 2006; Tardif, Shatz, & Naigles, 1997; 
Tardif, Gelman, & Xu, 1999) and Cantonese (Tse, Chen, & Li, 2005) than U.S. children of 
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comparable ages who show a more pronounced noun bias, (see Gentner 1981, 1982; Gentner & 
Boroditsky, 2001).  
These children's greater experience with relational language and socialization suggests 
that they may have a greater expertise in representing relational information. Thus, we 
hypothesized children from Hong Kong may tend to construct a somewhat different, and 
potentially more expert, representation of 2-relation problems than U.S. children.  There was no 
theoretical reason to expect differences in processing capacity (Hedden, Park, Nisbett et al, 2000) 
or baseline knowledge of the task since it was a novel task for everyone with simple relations 
(for more information see Richland et al, 2010).  
 Data were collected with 61 three and four year old children who were native Cantonese 
speakers.  Participants were sampled from Chinese pre-schools with similar demographics to the 
previously tested U.S. population. Like the U.S. children, children from Hong Kong showed a 
similar affect of distraction, favoring the featurally similar distractor to the relationally similar 
choice when it was present in the Distractor condition (see dashed line in Figure 6). However, 
unlike U.S. children, the Hong Kong sample showed no decline in performance for 2-Relation 
problems relative to U.S. children, and outperformed U.S. children on the 2-Relation problems.  
This was true for both the three year olds and four year olds when examined separately.  This 
reinforced our contention that these children may have a more expert, or at least a different, 
representation of the relational knowledge (verbs) needed to solve these multi-relation scene 
analogy problems. In order to ensure that the linguistic translation of the task could not have 
explained the differences, an additional control condition was run with three and four year old 
U.S. children using a back-translation of the Cantonese version, and the results replicated the 
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prior U.S. children's data (Richland et al, 2010).  The Chinese sample again outperformed the 
U.S. sample on 2-Relation problems.  
Simulating United States Children’s Analogical Reasoning 
We simulated children’s performance in the scene analogy problems to demonstrate that a 
systematic change in inhibition levels in LISA could account for age-related distraction and 
relational complexity performance changes in analogical reasoning.  To model the scene analogy 
problems we constructed LISA representations of the four problem types.  1-Relation problems 
were represented by a single, 2-place predicate (e.g., chase1(cat, mouse); see Figure 4ai. For 2-
Relation problems we represented both target relations explicitly as two, 2-place predicates (e.g., 
chase2 (dog, cat) and chase1 (cat, mouse); see Figure 4aii).1  As such, both relations were 
represented in LISA’s working memory together.  Thus, the 2-relation phase set (i.e., the number 
of SPs and their attached Predicate and Object units that must fire independently to represent the 
full relational structure in working memory; see Figure 4bi & 4bii) was double that of the 1-
Relation phase set. In LISA, units of the same type in the driver and recipient inhibit one another 
(i.e., SPs inhibit other SPs, Ps inhibit other Ps, etc).  In fact it is this inhibition that allows the 
various SPs in the phase set to have an opportunity to timeshare in working memory. To simulate 
each age group we changed the inhibition level between corresponding units in the driver and the 
recipient.  Younger age groups were assigned lower mean inhibition levels. 
Each simulation run consisted of firing three phase sets in LISA’s working memory, 
“randomly” assigned by LISA.  On each simulation an inhibition level for units in the recipient 
was sampled from a normal distribution with the means listed in Figure 7 and a SD of .1.  The 
inhibition between corresponding units in the driver and recipient were set to the inhibition level.  
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We ran 40 simulations of each problem type for each age group. When LISA failed to determine 
a stable mapping after firing three phase sets, an answer was selected based on Equation 1: 
!
! (eq. 1) 
where wij is the mapping weight from recipient unit i to driver unit j, max(wkj) is the maximum 
mapping weight all other recipient units k, where k is the same type as i, to driver unit j, 
max(mapWeight) was the highest mapping weight into any recipient object unit and driver unit j, 
and n is the number of object units in the recipient, and the probability, Pi, of selecting any 
recipient unit i, was given by: 
!   (eq. 2) 
where j is all units of the same type as i in the recipient (including unit i).   
 The simulation results along with the experimental results from Richland, Morrison & 
Holyoak (2006) are presented in Figure 7.  LISA’s performance mirrored experimental results for 
each age group across conditions, accounting for a large portion of the variance in the 
experimental results (R-sq = 0.97) with just a single parameter change. Specifically, LISA 
simulations showed: 1) a main effect of age, 2) an effect for both relational complexity and 
distraction for 3-4 year olds, 3) a smaller effect for both relational complexity and distraction for 
Ci =
1+ wij
n , wij > max(wkj )
1−max(mapWeight)
n , otherwise
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
Pi =
Ci
Cj
j
∑
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6-7 year olds than for 3-4 year olds, and finally 4) a mild effect for relational complexity, but no 
effect for distraction for 13-14 year olds.  
__________________________ 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
__________________________ 
Lowering the inhibition between units in LISA’s driver and recipient produced patterns of 
behavior that very closely resembled the age related differences in analogical ability exhibited by 
human children.  When there is less inhibition in the driver, LISA’s working memory efficiency 
is decreased because units that were just active are more likely to fire again immediately 
(because of their high level of activation), thus firing is less systematic. When there is less 
inhibition between units in the recipient, there is decreased competition between these units to 
respond to patterns of activation in the driver.  With less competition, more recipient units 
became active simultaneously, which impeded LISA’s ability to find the accurate mapping 
between source and target items (i.e., as each role and filler in the driver activated more 
numerous roles and fillers in the recipient, it was more difficult for LISA to determine which 
recipient units the active driver units corresponded to).  
Lastly, as in the experimental results, when LISA did not select the correct analogical 
mapping in the distractor conditions, the model preferentially chose the featurally similar 
distractor object. This was due to the distractor object in the recipient (e.g., sitting cat) sharing 
the most semantic units with the indicated object in the driver (e.g., running cat) and thus the 
distractor was the most likely object to be active via spreading activation. 
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Interestingly, decreasing inhibition levels captured the effects of both distraction and 
relational complexity and the interaction between them mimicking the exact pattern observed in 
human children. While distraction and relational complexity effects are sometimes thought of as 
distinct effects, these simulations suggest there may be a single underlying neural cause of these 
patterns of results, that is, limited inhibition between units. 
Simulating Hong Kong Children’s Analogical Reasoning 
H.K. 3-4 year old children performed better on 2-relation, No-Distractor problems than 
U.S. children (Richland et al, 2010).  One explanation for this might be that H.K. 3-4 year olds 
had greater working-memory capacity than U.S. children and this allowed them to more 
efficiently process the more relationally complex problem. While some early evidence seemed to 
suggest differences in working-memory capacity between western and eastern children, these 
differences have typically been explained in terms of differences in phonetics in very limited 
situations (see Baddeley, 1996). An alternative explanation is that H.K. children utilized a more 
efficient relational representation that minimized processing demands, thus allowing for greater 
success on two-relation problems in spite of similar processing capacity to US children of the 
same age.  This may have been facilitated by their greater experience with representing relations 
and producing verb phrases.  At this point we are not prepared to try and differentiate between 
potential causes for children's increased ability to represent relations, but the difference in the 
children's mental representations could explain their seemingly greater ability to solve complex, 
multi-relation analogies. Relational representation should not impact susceptibility to object 
distraction, however, since in these stimuli the object distractor was not a part of the relational 
Development of Analogical Reasoning  !26
group in the stimuli.  Thus, we hypothesized that the 3-4 year old Cantonese speakers would 
continue to show decrements in performance related to the object similarity distractor.   
To test this hypothesis we modeled 2-relations problems in LISA using a single three-
place proposition (i.e., chase (dog, cat, mouse)) instead of the two binary propositions (i.e., 
chase1 (dog, cat); chase2 (cat, mouse)) we used in modeling U.S. children’s performance (see 
Figure 4aiii).  In LISA, this change in representation results in only three role-bindings needing 
to be fired out of synchrony as opposed to the four role-bindings necessary for two binary 
propositions. Thus, the demands on LISA’s working memory are lower and correspondingly, 
inhibition is less critical. Experimental results for 3-4 year old children from both countries and 
the simulation results for both representations run at a low inhibition parameter setting (i.e., 0.6) 
are shown in Figure 8.  While a two-binary relational representation scheme better fits U.S. 
children’s performance, a single-ternary relational representation scheme better fits H.K. 
children’s performance. 
__________________________ 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
__________________________ 
Discussion 
In this paper we presented simulations in LISA that support the hypothesis that 
maturation of inhibitory control in working memory is critical for the development of adult-like 
analogical reasoning. Specifically, we demonstrated that simple changes in inhibition levels in 
LISA (i.e., inhibition between elements of competing relational representations in working 
memory) could account for both relational complexity and featural distraction effects in 
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children’s analogical reasoning performance from age 3 to 14 (Richland, Morrison & Holyoak, 
2006).  This account is consistent with previous simulations of results from frontal patients 
(Morrison et al., 2004) and older adults (Viskontas et al., 2004), whose analogical reasoning 
performance also suffered under increases in relational complexity and featural or relational 
distraction.  Given that inhibition is critical for maintaining systematic patterns of temporal 
synchrony (and asynchrony) in LISA, this result is also consistent with recent evidence 
suggesting that task-related neural synchrony as measured via EEG increases during childhood 
and adolescence (Uhlhaas et al., 2009).  
Secondly, we presented simulations in LISA that demonstrate how relational knowledge 
acquisition and inhibitory control in working memory can interact during development. 
Specifically, we demonstrated that a knowledge representation change from two, 2-place 
predicates into one, 3-place predicate, reduces the demands of processing a “2-relation” scene 
analogy problem in LISA.  This simulation thereby offers an explanation for why Hong Kong 
children perform better on 2-Relation analogy problems than United States children while still 
showing object featural-distraction effects at the lower inhibition levels used to model 3-4 year 
olds. It is important to note that an explanation solely based on relational knowledge acquisition 
is inadequate to explain these experimental results because both relational complexity and object 
featural distraction did not improve in the Hong Kong children together.  
These simulations in LISA are based on a number of assumptions about the basic 
cognitive abilities of young children. Specifically, we assume that young children are capable of 
learning and mapping explicit relations (e.g., Chen, Sanchez, & Campbell, 1997; Gentner & 
Rattermann, 1991; Goswami, 1992, 2001). We also assume that their working memory/executive 
Development of Analogical Reasoning  !28
functions are limited - an assumption that been been supported by many experimental studies 
(see Diamond, 2002; Fuster, 2008).  They also avoid the issue of how children discover relations 
and how they recognize these relations in a particular scene.  The solution to the problem of 
relation discovery has recently been offered by Doumas et al (2008) in a model that generates 
relational knowledge structures in the form used by LISA from real world unstructured  
examples.  The second issue, how reasoners decide which relations to attend to is an ongoing 
topic of study. In these simulations we simply represent the relations which children describe 
when asked what is going on in the scene.  These include the relational and featural knowledge 
structures. 
It is our contention that both relational knowledge acquisition and inhibitory control in 
working memory can shape an individual’s analogical reasoning performance. We suggest that 
the development of analogical reasoning in children can be conceptualized as an equilibrium 
between these two factors.  In particular, as children age their knowledge about relations 
advances while their working-memory capacity as modulated by inhibitory control also 
improves.  At a given time during development, the child is able to perform an analogical task 
based on both their level of relational knowledge and their working-memory resources.  
Specifically, the equilibrium operates such that greater relational knowledge can impose fewer 
processing demands while less knowledge imposes higher demands. Thus, Hong Kong children 
given the same working-memory resources can better solve relationally complex problems. More 
generally, as relational knowledge increases in a domain, the demands on working memory 
decline, allowing for more complex reasoning at any given age.  This pattern in cognitive 
development builds on an understanding of working-memory effects in expertise (e.g., Chase & 
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Simon, 1973) where advanced relational knowledge can decrease processing demands and 
thereby allow experts to accomplish cognitive tasks which novices cannot. 
We believe that to truly understand the development of relational reasoning in children, 
future experimental and computational studies must take into account both advances in relational 
knowledge and changes in inhibitory control in working memory.  In particular, we posit that 
better understanding of how these two aspects of development interact is essential to clarifying 
the developmental course of relational reasoning.  
!
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Footnote 
1While we hand-coded these representations to clearly embody our hypothesis in this 
study, they could have been generated using DORA (Doumas, Hummel, & Sandhofer, 2008) 
from unstructured examples of chasing between objects. 
!
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Counterbalanced versions of the "chase" Scene Analogy Problems (Richland, Morrison 
& Holyoak, 2006): a) 1-Relation/No Distractor, b) 1-Relation/Distractor, c) 2-Relation/No 
Distractor, d) 2-Relation/Distractor. 
!
Figure 2. LISA architecture for proposition chases (cat, mouse) showing the hierachical 
arrangement of localist (i.e., proposition, SP, predicate, object) and distributed (i.e., semantic) 
units..  
!
Figure 3. LISA rapidly learns what in the recipient goes with what in the driver by using a 
Hebbian learning algorithm to track what units of the same type are firing at the same time.  
These “mapping connections” are the basis for analogical mapping and inference. Here the 
mapping connections from various object units in several recipient analogs are shown to the cat 
object unit in the driver. 
!
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Figure 4. (a) LISA representations for the driver of scene analogy problems showing (i) a 1-
Relation problem, (ii) a 2-Relation problem represented with two propositions and, (iii) a 2-
Relation problem where the relations have been chunked into a single three-place proposition.  
(b) Firing diagrams for the three representations showing the various "phases" of firing to fully 
capture the relational structure in each type of problem. Note that the chucking the 2-Relation 
problem (iii) results in a smaller (i.e. shorter) WM phase set relative to the unchunked 2-Relation 
problem (ii) and that both 2-Relation representations have a larger WM phase set than the 1-
Relation problem (i). 
!
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Figure 5. Mapping Connections in LISA. Temporary synchrony results in the grouwth of 
mapping connections (via Hebbian Learning) in LISA between like types of units in the driver 
and recipient, These mapping connections are the basis of analogical mappings, which in this 
case allow LISA to “decide” that the boy in the recipient goes with the cat in the driver. 
!
Figure 6. Experimental results from several experiments (Richland, Morrison & Holyoak, 2006, 
Experiment 1; Richland, Chan, Morrison & Yu, 2010) using the scene analogy problems with 
children. 
!
Figure 7.  Comparison of experimental and LISA simulation results.  Change in performance of 
the scene analogy problems by US children is well fit by progressively decreasing inhibition in 
LISA to simulate younger children. 
!
Figure 8. Comparison of experimental and LISA simulation results.  US 3-4 year old children’s 
performance on 2-Relation problems is better fit in LISA by using a representation consisting of 
two binary (i.e., 2 (role) x 2 (filler)) propositions, while H.K. 3-4 year old children’s performance 
is better fit in LISA by using a representation consisting of one ternary (i.e., 1  (role) x 3 (filler) 
propositions. 
!
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